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  1RELATIONSHIP LOANS AND REGULATORY CAPITAL: 
WHY FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR BANK LOANS 
 
Banks have been required to report many securities and all derivatives at fair values 
under U.S. GAAP rules for many years. Soon, International Accounting Standards will provide 
some banks with a “fair-value option” for loans, also.
1  A similar movement toward applying fair 
values to loans may occur in the U.S. in the near future, too.  
This paper argues that fair-value accounting is inappropriate for banks’ relationship loans 
from the standpoint of safety-and-soundness supervision—that is, for the purposes of calculating 
a bank’s regulatory capital.  The argument is straightforward, although perhaps not obvious. 
The prudential issue that determines what should count as regulatory capital is whether 
the value created by an asset truly functions as capital in an economic sense—that is, as a buffer 
that can absorb losses to prevent a bank from failing.  Regulatory capital is the ultimate, all-
purpose hedge against shocks to a bank’s assets. 
A successful relationship loan creates relationship-specific capital in the sense that a 
continuing bank-borrower relationship is expected to generate revenues in excess of incremental 
costs.  To create this relationship loan and capital, a bank presumably incurred set-up costs; but 
these are sunk (and irrecoverable) after the investment is made. 
The component of capital represented by the present value of this earnings stream 
(relationship capital) cannot be liquidated or transferred to others.  Thus, it generates a return to 
the originating bank only as long as it remains a going concern and retains its borrower 
relationship.  But if a component of capital is not available unconditionally to absorb losses 
suffered on unrelated assets, then it does not serve the economic function of capital.  Therefore, 
the economic value created by a relationship loan—and reasonably reflected in a fair-value 
                                                           
1 See “Supervisory guidance on the use of the fair value option by banks under International Financial 
Reporting Standards,” Bank for International Settlements, July 2005, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs114.pdf. 
  2estimate of the loan’s cash flows—should not be included in regulatory capital for supervisory 
purposes. 
The key point we make is that the fair value of a relationship loan is based on its expected 
cash flows if and only if held to maturity (discounted by a rate that reflects the risk of the 
relationship ending for any reason).  By definition, this exceeds the loan’s value in premature 
liquidation.  Relationship-specific capital is embedded in the loan and cannot be transferred to 
others.  Therefore, relationship capital will be unavailable if and when needed to serve as a buffer 
against unexpected losses elsewhere in the bank’s portfolio. 
The model in the paper shows that this capital disappears when the bank is severely 
distressed because it stands to lose its relationship with the borrower.  The key is that we model 
the investments that the bank makes in a relationship as sunk costs, which cannot be sold to 
others.  Relationship capital is destroyed when the bank-borrower relationship ends. Relationship 
capital generates value for the bank only as long as the relationship stays in place—i.e., only as 
long as the bank is a going concern without regard to the loan in question. 
Hence, it would be inappropriate to include relationship capital in the fair value of the 
loan—or in the bank’s regulatory capital—even though it contributes to the expected present 
value of the loan’s cash flows.  Thus, fair-value accounting is inappropriate for banks’ 
relationship loans.  
  
I.  A model of relationship loans 
The borrowing firm.  Consider a firm with no wealth that needs $I today (t=0) to invest 
in a project.  The firm's project will pay $1 each period forever starting next period (t=1), unless 
it defaults in some period (with constant probability px, where x denotes the type of financing 
used, which affects the project risk, as explained below).  There is no liquidation value to the 
project after the start-up funds are borrowed and invested.  If the firm defaults, its project is 
worthless from then on. 
  3 
Transaction loan.  The borrower can obtain funds in the capital markets with a 
"transaction loan," i.e., at arm's length and without generating any "inside information."   The 
appropriate discount rate for the risk of the borrower's project if financed with a transaction loan 










So the present/fair value of the project if financed in the capital market (after financing, 















































































Relationship loan. The borrower also can obtain funds from a bank in the form of a 
"relationship loan," i.e., where, at some cost to the borrower and/or the lender, they can learn 
about each other and exchange information (build a relationship).  The benefits of the relationship 
loan are that it produces "inside information" that both enhances the cash flows and reduces the 
riskiness of the project.  One could think of the borrower getting good advice from the bank, 
while the bank is able to understand the business better, or becomes better able to monitor the 
loan. 
                                                           
2 The last line follows from the mathematics of infinite sums. 
  4The net benefit to the borrower of the relationship must be non-negative, or the borrower 
would not enter the relationship.  Likewise for the bank. 
We model the benefits of the relationship in two parts.  First, the firm’s cash flows grow 
at rate f each period forever, where 0 < f < rtl: 
 
()
1 1 1 f + ,  ( )
2 1 1 f + ,  ( )
2 1 1 f + , … 
 
The other benefit of the relationship is that the bank learns more about the project and 
therefore assigns a lower discount rate, rtl – b, to the cash flows, where 0 < b < rtl.  The lower risk 
of the project means the probability of default in any period is prl < ptl. (We also require that f + b 
< rtl; otherwise, the present value of the loan will be infinite). 
































































































The fair value of the relationship loan is unambiguously greater than the fair value of the 
transaction loan because prl < ptl and rrl < rtl: 
 
                                                           
3 This model is known in a different context as the Gordon dividend-growth model. 























For ease of exposition, let RC be the difference between the fair values of the relationship loan 
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Note that RC also represents the fire-sale or liquidation discount on a relationship loan.  
That is, if a project originally financed with a relationship loan is not in default and the bank 
needs to sell it to someone else, the loan will be worth only (1 – ptl)/rtl—the present value of the 
cash flows without a relationship. 
 
II.  Co-existence of transaction and relationship loans 
The condition for existence of both the transaction-loan market and the relationship-loan 
market is that borrowers are indifferent between financing their projects with transaction loans or 
relationship loans.  Therefore, the surplus from the relationship loan—if any—must be captured 
by the bank.  We assume that there are barriers to entry of some type in banking, so the surplus 
from relationship lending is not competed away to zero. 
 
III.  Fair value and regulatory capital 
Suppose a bank has assets with fair value of A and regulatory capital of K before a given 
relationship loan is undertaken.  A transaction loan has NPV = 0, so booking such a loan creates 
no surplus for the bank. 
  6 
Once a relationship loan is made and the relationship has been built, on the other hand, the bank’s 
assets and capital using fair values are, respectively: 
 
RC K





RC is the capitalized value of the relationship loan to the bank.  Should this be included as part of 
regulatory capital? 
Expected and unexpected losses.  Expected losses on assets are covered by the risk 
premium charged above the risk-free rate—  f tl r r − for transaction loans and  for 
relationship loans.  For simplicity, assume r
f rl r r −
f = 0.  The bank’s other assets likewise are priced to 
cover expected losses. 
The purpose of regulatory capital is to absorb unexpected losses on a bank’s assets—the 
difference between the actual loss, when it occurs, and the risk premium charged for that 
exposure. 
Suppose a transaction loan defaults in period t; the expected loss is rtl and the unexpected 
loss is 1 – rtl.  If a relationship loan defaults in period t, the expected loss is (1+f)
t rrl and the 
unexpected loss is (1+f)
t (1 - rrl).  Suppose the remainder of the bank’s assets are worth zero when 
they default; the unexpected losses on these assets then are A less the risk premiums charged on 
the assets.  Let the unexpected losses on the bank’s pre-existing assets be ULA = A – RA.   Because 
the bank has debt, ULA > K, and the pre-existing bank would be insolvent on a stand-alone basis 
with probability q, 0 < q < 1. 
A surplus generated by a newly booked asset (the relationship loan) should go into 
regulatory capital if and only if it is the case that these resources will be available to cover 
unexpected losses on pre-existing assets, and vice versa.  That is, will RC be available to absorb 
  7unexpected losses on the pre-existing assets?  Will K be available to absorb unexpected losses on 
the relationship loan? 
 
IV.  Why relationship capital should not be counted as part of regulatory capital 
We can describe the possible states of nature in any given period with a simple two-by-
two matrix.  Either the bank’s pre-existing assets default and are worthless, with probability q 
(row (1)) or not (row (2)).  Independently of this, the bank’s relationship loan will default and be 
worthless, with probability p (column (A)) or not (column (B)). 
 
Table 1.  Value of Relationship Capital Under All Outcome Scenarios 
 
Outcome of relationship loan 
 
Entries in body of table refer to capital 
available to cover unexpected losses and their 
associated ex ante probabilities of occurrence. 
(A) Default with 
probability p 
(B) No default with 
probability 1-p 
(1) Default with 
probability q 
0 with prob. pq  0 with prob. q(1-p)   
Outcome of bank’s 
pre-existing asset 
portfolio 
(2) No default with 
probability 1-q 
K with prob. (1-q)p  K + RC with prob.  
(1-q)(1-p) 
 
The problem with assigning the fair value of a relationship loan to regulatory capital is 
highlighted in box (1)(B).  With probability q, the bank’s pre-existing assets will default (row 
(1)).  Because ULA > K—i.e., the unexpected losses on the pre-existing assets exceeds the pre-
existing capital—the bank will try to draw on the relationship loan to cover losses.  If the 
relationship loan also is in default (box (1)(A)), then obviously there is nothing available to 
satisfy any claims.  In box (1)(B), one would think the relationship loan would be available to 
  8cover some of the losses.  But the surplus created by the relationship loan, RC, cannot be realized 
in a fire sale.  The value of the relationship loan is exclusively value in use, not in liquidation. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Our model demonstrates that the fair value of a relationship loan should not be included 
as part of regulatory capital.  Stated more precisely, the expected economic surplus created by the 
relationship loan, RC, is not available in all of its own non-default states of nature to cover 
unexpected losses arising elsewhere at the bank.  This was shown in the matrix in box (1)(B)—
the relationship loan was performing, yet it was not available to cover unexpected losses on the 
bank’s pre-existing assets.  Thus, this value should be deducted from regulatory capital. 
The issue highlighted here is that the surplus contributed to the bank from a relationship 
loan must be realized over time by maintaining the relationship with the borrower.  This value 
cannot be transferred to others and it cannot be realized in a liquidation.  Thus, for the reasons 
discussed, it should not be included in regulatory capital. 
  9